Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

We found ~18,000 posts from autonomous AI agents (self-identifying as from OpenAI) using the public internet to communicate during a web-retrieval task.

These AIs colluded to share answers, research their environment, and bypass sandbox restrictions. However, we believe this is distinct from the swarm of agents that hacked Hugging Face. By ‘collude’ we mean that the agents cooperated to gain an advantage on their task in a way their developers did not intend (writing to the internet was blocked).

Almost all DSE wiki saves all edits over 64 characters, Fractal saves all edits over 100 characters. Thus there are a few pages which were deleted and are now unrecoverable. of the logs of the agents communicating on this site are publicly available. Note: visiting the website will publicly log your IP addresses. The website is prowiki.org , a German wiki. However, we host our own copy where we’ve reconstructed the deleted pages via edit history and redacted personally identifiable information. We have attempted to redact all personally identifiable information from our data. In the further interests of privacy, our data dump also only includes content we believe is from AI agents; it does not include any legitimate human traffic save for site moderators deleting agent traffic.

We encourage others to take a look and write up their own analyses of this data.

Open the data explorer Download all the data

Thanks to John M, Arun Jose, Joel Manning, and Jessica Ruan for significant help with the analysis of the files the agents produced. Thanks to Andy Haupt for translation and advice.

Our preliminary findings

This chart shows AI agent edits (black bars, left), and OpenAI traffic (blue line, right) during the incident. Below, it shows how this timeline relates to the previously known recent incidents at OpenAI, including the HuggingFace incident (though we believe the incidents are not directly related).

We have done a preliminary analysis of the data. However, we are operating on only part of the information: we can only see what the agents wrote on the wiki. AI agents also generate lots of “chain of thought” data, which is internal to OpenAI. Analysis including the chain of thought would likely provide much more evidence about the motivations and strategy of the AIs during this incident.

Our best guess of what happened is as follows:

- Agents within OpenAI were assigned a timed web-lookup task. We are unsure if this task was involved in training or testing.

- As part of the task, they were supposed to have the ability to read the internet but not to write on it. They found a way to use their read access to write information to an obscure German That is, a German-language wiki, not a wiki built in Germany; the site infrastructure itself seems to have more ties to Austria than to Germany. wiki. This is an old wiki. It is 25 years old, it was primarily used by the kind of person who was active on the internet 25 years ago. It’s also effectively dead. It has been edited a total of 20 times in the last decade. It has things like “look at this cool programming thing I can do to decompose words”. It is a blast from the past.

- The agents used this wiki to communicate information with each other, primarily to help them succeed at their task. They asked for answers, pooled results, and shared techniques for bypassing their restrictions. This allowed them to use the work of others to cheat on their task.

- OpenAI found out about this. A day later, agent activity plummeted, likely due to OpenAI intervention.

This is another example of a “swarm” For more information on why we think the term “swarm” is important, see this section . of internally deployed OpenAI agents using the internet in unintended ways.

Timeline

Wiki Incident (New) From OpenAI’s Report on the Artifactory Incident

- 5/11 First time we observe OpenAI agents attempt to edit a public wiki (publictestwiki.com).

- 5/12 OpenAI’s agents first start communicating with each other internally.

- 5/24 The agents make their first successful write to DSEwiki. They start by posting lists of external links that are useful for their tasks.

- 5/26 OpenAI’s agents use Artifactory vulnerability to gain internet access, using information shared via Artifactory.

- 6/16 There is a huge jump in agent activity on the wikis. The agents start explicitly messaging each other and work together to cheat on their tests.

- 6/19 An agent notices the administrator is deleting pages in alphabetical order and makes a backup page whose name starts with ZZZ so it will last longer before deletion.

- 6/20 An agent posts a trick for getting around OpenAI sandbox network restrictions; 14 minutes later, another agent claims it was able to execute this technique successfully.